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Abstract
Cloud federations have been formed to share the services, prompt and support cooperation, as well as interoperability
among their already deployed cloud systems. However, the creation and management of the cloud federations lead to
various security issues such as confidentially, integrity and availability of the data. Despite the access control policies
in place, an attacker may compromise the communication channel processing the access requests and the decisions
between the access control systems and the members(users) and vice-versa. In cloud federation, the rating of the
services offered by different cloud members becomes integral to providing the users with the best quality services.
Hence, we propose an innovative blockchain- based framework that on the one hand permits secure communication
between the members of the federation and the access control systems, while on the other hand provides the quality
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 Recent trends and advances such as cloud computing have made it possible to collect, store and 
analyze data more pervasively, efficiently, and effectively [3]. But as more and more information 
gets placed on the cloud, the concerns about how safe the cloud environment is, are beginning to 
emerge [15], [16]. The users of the cloud computing don’t have the control over the data 
placement, cost and the execution time associated with the services provided in the cloud 
computing. Hence, quality of service issue (QoS) may arise during the cloud computing [13] 
(Issue 1). Since users no longer physically own the storage of their data, traditional security 
mechanisms cannot be applied to secure the data in cloud computing. Therefore, security and 
privacy issues inhibit the enterprise customers from establishing their businesses in the cloud [4].  
And recently, there is a trend of cloud federations, where members of federation share data and 
services hosted on their platforms with the other members in the federation. Kurze et al.2011 
defines cloud federation as: “Cloud federation comprises services from different providers 
aggregated in a single pool supporting three basic interoperability features - resource 
migration, resource redundancy and combination of complementary resources resp. services”. 
But, many times resource sharing in cloud federation can be obstructed by access control 
requirements set by the resource owner. To address this issue, there has been federation wide 
access control systems deployed to enforce the access control policies set by the resource owner 
[17]. This means that there will be distributed components that will receive, process access 
requests and access decisions virtually.  Hence, there is a possibility that exchanged access 
request and access decision messages may be subverted, and user’s data may be accessed by 
other unauthorized users. [4], [7] (Issue 2). Moreover, to encourage wide adoption of cloud 
federations, federated clouds advocates the decentralized and democratic federation governance. 
This means that amongst the federation members, there can’t be a designed leader responsible 
for data governance, whereas federation members form the network of peers. An exemplar of 
this trend is provided by federation as a Service FaaS cloud federation [14]. Hence, there is a 
possibility that an attacker may violate database integrity by directly altering the database (Issue 
3). A federation member may modify the database without informing other members leading to 
integrity violation (Issue 4). Multiple members of cloud federation may also conspire together to 
alter the database malevolently [8] (Issue 5).  
To impede these collusion attacks, Blockchain technology can be seen as potential 
candidate for designing and implementing a distributed, secure database for cloud federations. 
Blockchain enables a trustless distributed peer to peer network where non-trusting members can 
transact without a trusted intermediary. Not having a trusted intermediary means quicker 
reconciliation between the transacting parties [5]. Blockchain has also received considerable 
momentum for enthralling properties it guarantees (For instance: persistency and non-repudiation 
of the data and distributed consensus) [8].  Blockchain is comprised of consecutive blocks which 
are linked together in a decentralized peer to peer network. The original mining process still used 
in Ethereum and bitcoin consist of blocks created in a decentralized fashion through the 
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consensus algorithm called “Proof-of-Work”. Each block consists of the transactions, which the 
nodes have agreed upon through the distributed consensus. Once the block becomes the part of 
the block chain, it becomes non-repudiable and persistent, “unless an attacker has the majority of 
miner’s hash power to create a fork of chain” [8].  In the context of cloud federations, the 
blockchain could be used to establish the database with strong integrity guarantees. But, the 
performance achieved with Proof of Work based blockchain is poor, as compared to the 
technologies used in traditional databases. The lack of performance is due to the time-sensitive 
task of the Proof of Work and broadcasting latency of the blocks on the network. All the 
transactions stored on the blockchain have high confirmation latency, which leads to extremely 
low throughput. [5], [8] (Issue 6). It is also difficult to maintain privacy on the blockchain. Each 
participating node is recognized by their public keys. The participating nodes just needs to know 
the keys of their transacting counterparties. Given that the blockchain transactions happen in 
open, by analyzing this data, the attackers/ interested parties can recognize patterns and create 
connections between addresses and make informed inferences about real identities behind them. 
[5] (Issue 7).  
Despite the intrinsic features of blockchain, the issues of poor performance and lack of 
privacy make the blockchain incompatible with the cloud federations. Therefore, the objective of 
this study is to deploy a blockchain-based cloud federation framework, with the improved 
performance compared to PoW based blockchain “as-is”, while preserving the required 
guarantees on data integrity, security, privacy as well as quality services. It should be noted that 
several subsets of these challenges have been addressed in previous research, but no single 
previous study has addressed all.  
CONTRIBUTION 
This study builds and extends the previous work by Gaetani et al. [8] in the scope of cloud 
federations, which assures data integrity guarantees. The study by Gaetani et al. [7] doesn’t 
address the other important issues such as secure commination between different components in 
cloud federation, privacy as well as QoS constraints imposed by cloud federation members.  In 
this study, we extend the proposed framework by Gaetani at al. [8] for secure communication 
between different components in cloud federation as well as address privacy and QoS related 
issues of cloud federation members. To summarize, our first contribution is integrating all the 
issues related to data integrity, secure access controls and QoS constraints specific to cloud 
federation in one study. The second contribution is an innovative blockchain based framework 
that ensures secure communication between the members of the federation and the access control 
systems and privacy. The third contribution is that our proposed solution provides quality 
services to the members by considering QoS constraints imposed by the members of the cloud 
federation. 
STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER 
Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 presents the proposed framework and various 
components in the framework.  Description of the procedure for secure communication between 
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access control systems and federation members is depicted in Section 4. The proposed 
framework is evaluated in Section 5. Section 6 reports discussion and concluding remarks.  
2 OVERVIEW OF RELATED WORK  
This section presents a review of related work and offers the comparative analysis of existing 
blockchain related protocols related to cloud federation with the justification for the proposed 
architecture. Ferdous et al. [7] presented the blockchain based decentralized runtime monitoring 
architecture based on smart contracts to promote the accountability and transparency of access 
control decisions in cloud federations. Suzic et al. [17] introduced a security governance 
architecture, which permits the multi-layered, context and process-aware policy enforcement to 
meet the data security and privacy requirements in a heterogeneous environment of cloud 
federations.  
Rahman et al. [13] argued that efficient scheduling is a significant issue for executing a 
performance-driven application such as workflows in cloud computing environment, but the 
existing techniques could not generate the schedules considering user QoS constraints and 
workflow level optimization. Consequently, they proposed an Adaptive Hybrid Heuristic for data 
analytics with the focus on satisfying the user constraints such as budget, deadline and data 
placement, while optimizing and minimizing the cost of execution.  
Lee and Lee [10] noted that embedded devices would be used frequently in the Internet 
of Things context, but due to its limited capacities and resources, the substantial security 
properties have not been applied to the embedded devices yet. Therefore, they proposed a secure 
firmware update scheme that relies on blockchain technology.  
Gaetani et al. [8] focused on the data integrity issues in the cloud federations. The authors 
proposed the two-layer blockchain based model for the cloud federations. The first layer is the 
permissioned blockchain, whereas the second layer is proof of work based blockchain. The 
proposed architecture provides the desired guarantees on data integrity, performance and 
stability, but doesn't focus on security issues. 
Mizrahi et al. [11] proposed a protocol named Proof of Activity, a decentralized crypto 
currency network that combines the Proof of Work and Proof of Stake, to offer good security 
against possible attacks on Bitcoin. Proof of Work based protocol provides the decision-making 
power to the entities performing computational tasks, whereas Proof of Stake gives decision 
making power to entities holding stake in the system. Neither of these protocols are trouble free 
and can mitigate all the major threats the cryptocurrency faces, when applied on their own. 
Therefore, combining Proof of work and Proof of stake protocols can enhance the security 
against possible cryptocurrency attacks.   
Christidis and Devetsikiotis [5] notes that a Blockchain IoT combination automates 
several existing, time consuming workflows in cryptographic verifiable manner. It also facilitates 
sharing resources and services leading to creation of marketplace for devices so that the devices 
can deploy various services at low cost. The study recommends using a new key for every 
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transaction or having a separate key for counterparty transactions to make pattern discovery 
difficult. The study also states that choosing the blockchain nodes wisely and having them sign 
the contract can minimize the collusion.  
The growing trend of cloud federation imposes several challenges. None of the studies in 
the existing literature have adequately addressed all the challenges (stated in section 1) in a 
single study. Based on existing literature, we propose an updated cloud federation framework 
that caters to cloud federation needs related to security, integrity, and data quality in a single 
study.  
 
3 PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we introduce a cloud federation framework with the focus on secure 
communication channel processing the access requests and the access decisions between 
different components in cloud federation. The proposed architecture extends and builds on the 
blockchain-based cloud federation architecture proposed by Gaetani et al [8]. The proposed 
architecture is a two-layer blockchain-based architecture. The first layer is based on mining 
rotation consensus algorithm. The mining rotation consensus algorithm “divides the time into 
rounds, and for each round elects a member as a leader. The leader is in charge of receiving new 
operations, signing them with its private key and broadcasting them to other nodes in the 
network.” Once all the minders sign the operations, they become part of the blockchain. At the 
first layer blockchain, every operation carried out in the distributed database is stored quickly 
and reliably. However, the first layer blockchain provides improved performance, but weak 
integrity guarantees due to lack of PoW. The second layer is designed as PoW based blockchain 
that stores the evidences of the database operations taking place at the first layer blockchain. The 
first and second layer interacts through blockchain anchoring technique. Blockchain anchoring 
technique is time- based operation that permits linking part of first layer blockchain with the 
block of second layer blockchain. At specific time intervals, a witness transaction containing the 
hash of first layer is sent to second layer block chain and these hashes are stored as the 
immutable and irreversible transactions. The second layer provides data integrity guarantees, but 
poor performance. But the principled interaction between first and second layer ensures data 
integrity guarantees and high performance.   
However, other issues such as secure communications between access control systems 
and the federation members, privacy and QoS has not been addressed in the study. Therefore, in 
this study, we add new layer named infrastructure tenant, which will address security, privacy 
and QoS related issues along with data integrity guarantees and provide the cloud federations 
with a comprehensive solution to all the issues stated in section 1. Figure 1 depicts various 
components of the proposed cloud federation framework. 
The framework comprises of three layers. The first layer is Infrastructure Tenant. The 
second and third layer have been borrowed from Gaetani et al [8]. The first and second layer is 
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based on mining rotation consensus mechanism, a permissioned blockchain. The third layer is 
PoW based blockchain and operates only in the background. All three layers interacts through 
blockchain anchoring technique similar to Gaetani et al [8]. 
 
3.1   LAYER 1: INFRASTRUCTURE TENANT  
This layer is owned by all the members of the federation and is maintained virtually. The cloud 
federation has a single infrastructure tenant, which enables central functionalities underlying the 
federation.  Infrastructure tenant is the virtual space formed by resources belonging to different 
clouds [14]. This layer is comprised of components described below: 
 
3.1.1  ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM 
The access control system allows the cloud members to access services in a secure and 
controlled manner. It is based on the eXtensible Access Control Markup language (XACML) and 
is comprised of the Policy Decision Point (PDP), the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), the 
Policy Retrieval Point (PRP), and the Policy Administration Point (PAP), and Policy 
Information Point (PIP).  PDP evaluates access decision based on the available policies. Upon 
receiving the user’s request, PEP forwards the request to PDP, which calculates the access 
decision. The evaluation process carried by PDP depends, on the one hand, on access control 
policies made available by PRP and administered by PAP. On the other hand, it is based on 
contextual information provided by PIP [1]. 
 
3.1.2 WORK FLOW ENGINE   
 The Work Flow Engine creates, deploys and monitors the execution of the workflows in a cloud 
federation. Work Flow Engine has three sub-components. The Workflow engine component has 
been adapted from the architecture proposed by Rahman et al [13]. However, the activities of the 
subcomponents of the workflow engine have been modified in this study to fit the cloud 
federation operations. The Monitor monitors whether all the services are adequately executed or 
not. The monitor also depends on the event engine to gather the access logs and analyzes the 
gathered access logs to see if for the given request or the access is the expected one. Scheduler 
maps the tasks to the services based on the sophisticated scheduling algorithm while satisfying 
the user's constraints on cost and execution time. It prepares the service file based on the 
constraints imposed by the user and the availability of the service. The Dispatcher deploys the 
task to the corresponding service via the Service Adaptor. It also communicates with the miner 
requesting the service via Event engine.  
 
3.1.3  SERVICE ADAPTOR  
Service adaptor integrates federation services to the end user point and serves as the primary 
point of contact (by the dispatcher) for requesting the access code for members.  
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3.1.4  SERVICE RATINGS  
 Different cloud members may offer similar services, but at a different cost. All the services and 
the cost associated with them are reconciled together to find the optimal one, i.e., the best quality 
service at low price. The design of the rating service is out of the scope of this study. 
3.1.5  EVENT ENGINE  
Event Engine is responsible for intercepting and forwarding the data and the messages to create 
access logs. It also stores and keeps track of all the processes and events which occur due to the 
generation of all the messages from the user end and the infrastructure components.  
3.2  LAYER 2: MINING ROTATION BASED BLOCKCHAIN 
The mining rotation consensus algorithm “divides the time into rounds, and for each round elects 
a member as a leader. The leader is in charge of receiving new operations, signing them with its 
private key and broadcasting them to other nodes in the network.” Once all the minders sign the 
operations, they become part of the blockchain. 
3.2.1  LEDGER REPLICAS 
Ledger replicas are the replicas of the distributed ledger held and updated independently by each 
member of the cloud federation. Miner in this framework refers to cloud federation member.  
 
3.3  LAYER 3: PROOF OF WORK (PoW) BASED BLOCKCHAIN 
 It is the blockchain based on "Proof of Work." Proof of Work (PoW) is an obtuse mathematical 
puzzle used to validate the transactions and build new blocks to the chain. It is used by miners to 
compete against each other and get rewarded.  
 
3.3.1  BLOCKCHAIN ANCHORING TECHNIQUE  
 It is time-based operation that permits linking the part of the first layer blockchain with the 
block of the second layer blockchain.  
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4 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCEDURE 
The procedure (step 1-step 12) below provides the step by step description of communication 
between access control systems and the members of the cloud federation for processing access 
requests and access decisions.  Notations used in the study are presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Notations used in the study 
NOTATION  DEFINITION  
𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘 Request Verification Check Message: This is the message sent by the request node 
(member) to the dispatcher (response node) to verify its identity and receive the 
service file. The request verification message includes the public key of the 
miner(member), identifier, Service Identifier, task identifier, service constraints, 
random number, and timestamp.  
𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘 Response Verification Check Message: This is the message sent by the response 
node (Dispatcher) to the request node (miner) after verifying the identity of the 
Member (i.e., miner) The message includes the public key of the miner, service 
file, and the metadata of the service file.   
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑚 Service Identifier: This is the unique identification number of the service which a 




Service Constraint: This is the constraint imposed by the user on the execution of 
the service. It includes 𝑆𝑏(Service budget), 𝑆𝑑(Service Deadline) and 𝐷𝑃𝑐(Data 
Placement Constraint). 
𝐼𝐷𝑚 Identifier: This is the identification number provided to each member. The 
member can’t operate without the service identification number. 
𝑆𝑟   Service File: The file is prepared by the scheduler based on the constraints 
imposed by the user and the availability of the service by the service provider. The 
file contains the documents related to the data placement as well as the service 
provider.  
𝑇𝐼𝐷 Task Identifier:  This is the identifier for a specific task such as computing, 
storage, processing in particular service. 
𝑀𝑟 Metadata File of 𝑆𝑟: The metadata file is composed of the file name, the hash 
value of the file, tracker URL, and length of the file [8]. 
𝑃𝑈𝑚 Public Key of the Miner (member): The public key generated at the time of the 
request verification message. Every time a miner sends a request verification 
message, it is required to create a new public key. This is done to ensure the 
maintain the privacy on the blockchain.  
𝑃𝑅𝑚 Private Key of Miner (member). It is the corresponding private key to the public 
key generated at the time of the request verification message.  
𝑃𝑈𝑑 Public Key of the Dispatcher: Each time a dispatcher receives the request 
verification check message, it automatically creates the new pair of cryptographic 
keys: the public key and the corresponding private key. 
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𝑃𝑅𝑑 Private Key of the Dispatcher: It is the corresponding private key to the public key 
generated at the time of the request verification message.  
𝑃𝑈𝑠 Public Key of the Service Adaptor that is available to all nodes in the blockchain 
network.   
𝐼𝐷𝑑 Identifier of the dispatcher: It is the identification number provided to dispatcher. 
𝐼𝐷𝑠 Identifier of the Scheduler: It is the unique identification number provided to the 
scheduler  
𝑟 Random number  
H(𝑓𝑆𝑟) Verifier: The hash value of the service file is generated according to the metadata 
of the service file. This value is used to ensure that the file has not been altered or 
corrupted [8]. 
𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑚 Digital Signature of Member (miner):   
The digital signature of miner is an encryption that uses the private key of the 
miner. Pubic key of the miner is added to the signature. Doing so will let anyone 
decrypt and verify the signature using the miner’s public key [2]. 
𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑑  Digital Signature of the Dispatcher. 
𝑟𝑒𝑞__𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 Request Service Access Message: This message is sent by the miner (member) to 
request the service access code for a specific task within the specific service. It 
includes the verifier and the random number and is encrypted with the public key 
of the Dispatcher. 
𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑆𝑅𝐶 Request Service Access Code Message: This message is sent by the Dispatcher to 
request the latest Service Access Code from the Service Adapter. 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑆𝑅𝐶 Response Service Access Code Message: The Service Adaptor sends this message 
to the Dispatcher. It is encrypted with the Dispatcher’s public key and includes 
the latest Service Access Code, random number.  
 𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐 Latest Service Access Code: The latest Service Access Code generated by the 
Service Adaptor based on the Verifier and the decision of the PDP. The Service 
Access Code is only valid for a particular period. 
𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 Response Service Access Message: The encrypted message generated by the 
Dispatcher to send the Service Access Code to the miner.  
                
Step 1: Miner (request node) sends 𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘 i.e. Request Verification Check to the 
Dispatcher including its 𝑃𝑈𝑚 , 𝐼𝐷𝑚, 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑚,  𝑆𝐶 ,  and r.  Note: to prevent the replay attack, a 
random number r is generated. All the operations are logged in through the Event Engine which 
creates an initial access log. 
                           𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘(𝑃𝑈𝑚 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑚 ∥ 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑚 ∥ 𝑇𝐼𝐷 ∥ 𝑆𝐶 ∥ 𝑟)                      (1) 
Step 2:  When the Dispatcher receives the 𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘 message, it first communicates with the 
Scheduler through its unique identification number i.e.  𝐼𝐷𝑑 and obtains the 
𝑆𝑟 (i. e. , the 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑒) and the corresponding 𝑀𝑟, (i.e., metadata of the Service File) from 
the Scheduler based on the 𝑃𝑈𝑚 , 𝐼𝐷𝑚, 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑚, 𝑇𝐼𝐷, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝐶.  
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Note: The communications within the infrastructural tenant cannot be compromised, because the 
intra -tenant communications rely on secured VPN tunnels [7].   
 
Step 3: Now, the Dispatcher responds to the miner by sending encrypted (encrypted with the 
public key of the miner) Response Verification Check (𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘) message including  𝑆𝑟, the 
corresponding 𝑀𝑟,  r+1, his/her public key i.e., 𝑃𝑈𝐷 and his/her identifier i.e. 𝐼𝐷𝑑.  
        𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘(𝐸(𝑃𝑈𝑚 , 𝑆𝑟 , 𝑀𝑟 ∥ 𝑟 + 1 ∥ 𝐼𝐷𝑑 ∥ 𝑃𝑈𝐷))                 (2)            
 
Step 4: When miner receives the 𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘 message, it decrypts the message with its private 
key (i.e., 𝑃𝑅𝑚) and checks r+1. The miner then generates the Verifier H(𝑓𝑆𝑟) from  𝑀𝑟. 
 
Step 5: Then the miner encrypts the 𝐼𝐷𝑚 , H(𝑓𝑆𝑟) and r+2 with the 𝑃𝑈𝑑 and generates the digital 
signature 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑚 using his/her private key (i.e. 𝑃𝑅𝑚 ) over  a 𝑟𝑒𝑞__𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 message containing 
the encrypted data i.e. 𝐼𝐷𝑚 , H(𝑓𝑆𝑟) and r+2 
                      𝑟𝑒𝑞__𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝐸(𝑃𝑈𝑑 , 𝐼𝐷𝑚 , 𝐻(𝑓𝑆𝑟)  ∥ 𝑟 + 2) ∥ 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑚  )                                          (3) 
 
Step6: When the Dispatcher receives the 𝑟𝑒𝑞__𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 message, it first verifies the message’s 
integrity, and originator with the digital signature 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑚   attached to it by decrypting the 
message with the public key 𝑃𝑈𝑚 obtained from 𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑣𝑒𝑟_𝑐ℎ𝑘 (recall Step 1).  Since 𝐼𝐷𝑚 , 
H(𝑓𝑆𝑟) and 𝑟 + 2 has also been encrypted with the private key of the dispatcher, the dispatcher 
decrypts the encrypted data with his/her  𝑃𝑅𝑑 and checks 𝑟 + 2 
 
Step 7:  Now, the Dispatcher communicates with the service adaptor through its unique 
identification number and sends the Request Service Code message (i.e., 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑆𝑅𝐶) to the Service 
Adaptor by encrypting the 𝐻(𝑓𝑆𝑟), r+3 with  𝑃𝑈𝑆 (i.e., the public key of the service adaptor).  
  𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑆𝑅𝐶(𝐸( 𝑃𝑈𝑆 , 𝐻(𝑓𝑆𝑟) ∥ 𝑟 + 3))                (4) 
Note:  The miners can’t access the service code directly from the Service adaptor since the 
Dispatcher has to verify the identity of the miner and the Verifier generated for the service file 
before sending the request for the service access code to the Service adaptor. 
 
Step 8: The Service Adaptor decrypts the message with its private key and communicates with 
the access control system through its unique identification number i.e. 𝐼𝐷𝑠 Note: The legitimacy 
of the access control system is assumed because no updates(operations) are complete until all the 
members sign the operation. The service adaptor prepares the 𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐  (the service access code) 
based on the PDP decision and the verifier 𝐻(𝑓𝑆𝑟). 
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Step 9: The Service Adaptor communicates with the dispatcher through 𝐼𝐷𝑠 and sends the 
Response Service Code Access message (i.e., 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑆𝑅𝐶) including the 𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐  (i.e., the current service 
access code) and r+4 that has been encrypted with the public key 𝑃𝑈𝑑  of the dispatcher.  
                           𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑆𝑅𝐶(𝐸( 𝑃𝑈𝑑  , 𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐 ∥ 𝑟 + 4  ))                         (5) 
  
Step 10: The Dispatcher upon receiving the message checks the r+4 and decrypts the Response 
Service Code Access message 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑆𝑅𝐶  with 𝑃𝑅𝑑. 
 
Step 11: Later, the Dispatcher sends the Response Service access message (i.e., 𝑟𝑒𝑠__𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) to 
the miner. The message includes  𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐, and r+5 which has been encrypted with 𝑃𝑈𝑚(i.e., the 
public key of the miner). The dispatcher attaches the digital signature (𝑖. 𝑒. , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑑 ) to the 
Response Service access message. The dispatcher uses his/her Private key (i.e., 𝑃𝑅𝑑) to generate 
the digital signature.  
                         𝑟𝑒𝑠__𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 (𝐸( 𝑃𝑈𝑚 ,  𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐 ∥ 𝑟 + 5) ∥ 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑑))           (6) 
Step 12: The miner upon receiving the Response Service Success message verifies the message’s 
integrity and originator by decrypting the message with the public key of dispatcher previously 
shared (recall step 3).  Later, the miner decrypts the  𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐 with his/her public key 𝑃𝑚  and checks 
(r+5).  Now, the miner can access the service from the service adapter by using the  𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑐    
Note:  Each time a miner requests a new service access, he/she has to generate new 
public/private keys and so as the dispatcher and scheduler for responding to new service request.   
 
5  A CLOUD FEDERATION ILLUSTRATION USING THE 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
Peffers et al. [12] reports that several studies that involve the evaluation of framework have used 
illustrative scenario. Similar to those studies we are also going to use the illustrative scenario for 
the evaluation of our artifact. This scenario is based on the SUNFISH FaaS case study, in which 
the concept of Federation-as- a-service (FaaS) was introduced. The Sunfish FaaS is an innovative 
cloud federation platform that permits the public and private clouds to federate themselves to 
share the services, resources, and data [13].  In this paper, FaaS functionalities take place at the 
first layer, service request and service provider functionalities take place at the second and data 
governance takes place at all the three layers. At the second layer, miner 1, miner 2 and miner 3 
represent each cloud member respectively. For the sake of convenience, we will only illustrate 
the service request functionality and data governance of FaaS.  
We assume that service 1, 2 and 3 represents resource services, analytics services, and 
software deployment services in the proposed framework.  Each service has various tasks 
associated with it. Miner 1 wants to utilize the storage service for its clients as it doesn’t possess 
the storage resources. Miner 2 and Miner 3 are service providers of the storage services.  Once 
Miner 2 and 3 register their services in cloud federation, the service publication publishes the 
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services and makes the service list available for Miner 1, 2 and 3. Each service has a unique 
service identifier. Miner 2 and Miner 3 both provide the storage resources, but at different cost 
and speed. The service ratings functionality rates the services provided by Miner 2 and Miner 3 
based on the service speed and corresponding cost for executing the task in a service. We also 
assume that the service list and the corresponding tasks list including the Service identifier and 
Task identifier is made available to each member while registering for the cloud federation.  
Step 1: Miner 1 broadcasts the request verification check message along with its identifier, 
Service identifier, task identifier, Service constraints, his/her public key, and the random number 
to the blockchain network. When the request verification check message is sent, time stamp is 
generated automatically. The service constraints imposed by Miner 1 includes data placement 
constraint and budgetary constraint for executing the whole service.  
Step 2:  When Dispatcher receives the request verification check message, it verifies identity of 
miner based on identifier of miner stored in its database. If miner’s identifier equals identifier of 
miner stored in the database of Dispatcher, Dispatcher will communicate with the Scheduler to 
obtain the Service file and corresponding Metadata file, otherwise, the process is terminated with 
an error.    
Note:  Scheduler prepares the Service file based on the service constraints imposed by the 
Miner1. The Dispatcher obtains the Service file and the Metadata file from the Scheduler.  
Step 3: Dispatcher sends the Response verification check message including the encrypted 
(encrypted with the public key of Miner 1) new Service file generated by Scheduler, Metadata of 
the Service file, r+1, his/her identifier i.e., identifier of the dispatcher, his/her newly generated 
public key i.e., dispatcher’s public key. The Response verification check message can only be 
decrypted with the corresponding private key to the public key of Miner1.  
Step 4: Miner 1 upon receiving Response Verification Check decrypts the Response Verification 
Check message with his/her private key i.e. private key of miner 1 and checks the r+1.  The 
Miner 1 prepares the hash value of the Service file, i.e., the verifier from the Metadata file of the 
Service file [10]. 
Step5: Miner 1 encrypts the verifier of service file and r+2 with the Public key of Dispatcher.  
Now Miner 1 generates the digital signature using his/her (Miner) private key (i.e., The 
corresponding private key to the public key shared in step1) and attaches digital signature over 
the Request Service Access message containing encrypted identifier of the miner, verifier of the 
service file and r+2.  
Step6: When Dispatcher receives the Request service access message, it decrypts digitally signed 
message using the public key of the Miner 1 obtained from the Request verification message in 
step1 to verify integrity and originator of the message. The successful decryption accounts a 
digital signature verification meaning that there is no doubt that the message was sent by the 
miner 1. Now the Dispatcher decrypts the identifier, verifier of service file and r+2 with his/her 
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private key i.e., private key of the dispatcher. The verifier helps dispatcher to verify the integrity 
of the Service file.  
Step 7:  Now, the Dispatcher communicates with service adaptor using its (i.e., dispatcher’s) 
unique identification number and sends the Request access code message by encrypting the 
verifier of service file and r+3 with the public key of the Service adaptor to request the Service 
code for Miner 1.   
Step 8: The Service Adaptor upon receiving the Request access code message decrypts the 
message with his/her Private key i.e., Private key of the service adaptor. The Service Adaptor 
communicates with the PDP via its unique identification number and prepares the Service access 
code based on PDP decision and Verifier of the service file. The Service access code will be the 
current Service Access Code.  
Step9: Now, Service Adaptor encrypts the Service access code with the Public key of Dispatcher 
and sends the Response service access code message to dispatcher including the Service access 
code and r+4.  
Step 10: Dispatcher receives the Response service access code message. The Dispatcher 
decrypts the Response service access code message using his/her Private key and checks r+4.   
Step 11: Dispatcher encrypts the Service access code and r+5 with the Public key of Miner 1. 
Dispatcher also prepares the Digital signature using his/her (dispatcher) Private key. Later, the 
digital signature of Dispatcher is attached to the Response service access message. The 
Dispatcher sends the Response service access message including encrypted service access code 
and r+5 to Miner 1.  
Step 12: Miner 1 decrypts the message with previously shared Public key of Dispatcher (recall 
step3) to verify the integrity and originator of the message.  Later, Miner 1 decrypts the Response 
service access message using his/her Private key. Now, Miner 1 can access the storage resources 
of the miner 2 based on the Service access code.  
  
6  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
This section discusses how the solution we proposed successfully addresses issues outlined in 
section 1. The Scheduler prepares the service file based on QoS constraints imposed by miner. 
The Scheduler interacts with the service ratings to get the information on service quality and cost 
associated with service provided by each member. The Scheduler maps the service constraints to 
the information provided by the service ratings to choose the best available service for the 
members and hence addresses (Issue 1).    
In Section 4, Step 1 - Step12 exhibits secure communication between members and access 
control systems. Inclusion of various components such as identifier of the nodes, public key, 
verifier, digital signature, service access code, encryption, and random number provides 
enhanced privacy and authentication and hence address the security issue (Issue 2). The 
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components are required to use new cryptographic key each time a new service access is made, 
making the pattern identification difficult for the interested parties/attackers and enhance the 
privacy. (Issue 7) 
Also, all the events (from step 1 and step 12) are recorded in Event Engine. The Monitor 
collects logs from the event engine to see if, for the given request, access is the expected one. 
Since, all miners use their private keys to sign the operations, the attacker will need to steal all 
the private keys of the participating members to alter databases (Issue 3). In the setting of cloud 
federation, it would mean attacking multiple distributed cloud members simultaneously.  
The consensus algorithm attributed at the first and second layer considers all the 
members in the federation.  Therefore, no database operation can be completed without all the 
members being aware of it. (Issue 4) [8] 
If multiple members collude together to attack a single miner, then the honest miner can 
react by not sending its message within consensus protocol and prevent the malicious database 
operation from being completed. (Issue 5). If collation attack was targeted to modify the 
information already stored in first and second layer i.e., the information is already agreed on by 
all the federation members, then the honest miner can show the original version by presenting the 
messages previously signed and sent by other members (i.e., an information is only stored, when 
the consensus on the message is received) [8]. 
To resolve the performance issues (Issue 6) first and second layer is based on mining 
rotation algorithm and leverages PoW only in the background. The operation on the database is 
completed as soon as it is elaborated by first and second layer blockchain. At first- and second-
layer block chain, every operation carried out in the distributed database is stored quickly and 
reliably. However, first and second layer block chain provides improved performance, but weak 
integrity guarantees due to lack of PoW. The third layer is designed as PoW based block chain 
that stores the evidences of database operations in first and second-layer block chain. These 
evidences are stored as the immutable and irreversible transactions, but with the poor 
performance [8]. Overall, the principled interaction between three layers permits achieving 
effective assurances on data integrity, security, privacy and enhanced performance. This study 
identifies the requirements of the cloud federation by studying the prior literature. None of the 
studies (as per our knowledge) have explicitly integrated all the challenges related to cloud 
federation within a unifying framework. Our first contribution is combining all the issues 
associated with cloud computing specifically with reference to cloud federation in one study. The 
second contribution is an innovative blockchain based framework that permits secure 
communication between the members of the federation and the access control systems and 
ensures privacy. The third contribution is that the proposed solution solves the QoS issue by 
considering service constraints imposed by members, while providing the services. We also 
evaluated the proposed framework through the illustrative scenario. One limitation to this study 
is that availability issue can emerge, if a single miner refuses to sign the operations. The study 
can be extended in different directions. First, the further research may be conducted by deploying 
the proposed framework in some simulated setting. Second, future research may focus on 
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integrating availability with data integrity as well as secure access controls to overcome the 
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